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Metrics and frameworks to quantiably assess security measures have arisen from needs of three distinct
research communities—statistical measures from the intrusion detection and prevention literature, evaluation
of cyber exercises, e.g., red-team and capture-the-ag competitions, and economic analyses addressing cost-
versus-security tradeos. In this paper we provide two primary contributions to the security evaluation
literature—a representative survey, and a novel framework for evaluating security that is exible, applicable
to all three use cases, and readily interpretable. In our survey of the literature we identify the distinct themes
from each community’s evaluation procedures side by side and esh out the drawbacks and benets of each.
e evaluation framework we propose includes comprehensively modeling the resource, labor, and aack
costs in dollars incurred based on expected resource usage, accuracy metrics, and time. is framework
provides a unied approach in that it incorporates the accuracy and performance metrics, which dominate
intrusion detection evaluation, the time to detection and impact to data and resources of an aack, favored
by educational competitions’ metrics, and the monetary cost of many essential security components used
in nancial analysis. Moreover, it is exible enough to accommodate each use case, easily interpretable
and comparable, and comprehensive in terms of costs considered. Finally, we provide two examples of the
framework applied to real-world use cases. Overall, we provide a survey and a grounded, exible framework
with multiple concrete examples for evaluating security which can address the needs of three currently distinct
communities.
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detection systems;
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1 INTRODUCTION
As security breaches continue to aect personal resources, industrial systems, and enterprise
networks, there is an ever growing need to understand, “How secure are my systems?” is need has
driven diverse eorts to systematize an answer that provides meaningful quantiable comparisons.
In the research literature, evaluation of information security measures has developed from three
dierent but related communities. A vibrant and growing body of research on intrusion detection
and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) has produced algorithms, soware, and system frameworks to
increase security; consequently, evaluation criteria to assess the ecacy of these ideas has been
informally adopted. Most common methods require representative datasets with labeled aacks
and seek traditional statistical metrics, such as true/false positive rates.
Analogous developments emerged from cyber security exercises, which have become com-
monplace activities for education and for enterprise self assessment. Scoring for red-team and
capture-the-ag educational exercises are necessary to the framework of the competitions, and
generally provide more concrete measures of security as they can accurately quantify measures
of network resources, e.g., the time that a server was oine or the number of records stolen. In
a similar vein to these competitions are red team events and penetration testing of soware or
systems. is practice is commonplace and seeks to enumerate all vulnerabilities in a product or
security posture. While there is a body or research literature on red teaming and penetration testing
(independent of cyber competitions), it does not provide quantiable assessments for security
(as is necessary for cyber competitions). Rather, it provides specic lists of weaknesses. us
penetration testing is a powerful capability proving important information for hardening and
qualitative understanding of security.
More pragmatic needs for quantifying security arise at the interface of an organization’s nancial
and security management. Justifying security budgets and identifying optimal use of resources
requires concise but revealing metrics intelligible to security experts and non-experts alike. To
this end, intersections of the security and economic research communities have developed cost-
benet analyses that give methods to determine the value of security. As we shall see, the desired
summary statistics provide a platform for quantiable analysis, but are oen dependent on intangible
estimates, future projections, and lack semantic understanding.
While these sub-domains of security research developed rather independently, their overarching
theme is the same—to evaluate security of systems, operators, and processes. In particular, the
metrics developed by each lane of research seek to provide a quantiable, comparablemeasure
to validate and reason about the ecacy of security capabilities. e goal of this article is
to build on the advantages of these previous works to provide such a scoring framework that
accommodates analysis of security tools and procedures, especially to support security and network
operation centers. While our focus is admiedly on comparing and evaluating the overall eects
of intrusion detection capabilities, the framework can indeed be used for other types of tools
or changes in procedures. For example, adopting a modern SIEM (security and incident event
management system) tool or changing operating procedures may both lower investigation and
response times (which is taken into account in the model), and hence can be compared to each
other as well as to, say, adoption of an endpoint detection capability that increases accuracy of
alerts but not eciency of response.
is work delivers two primary contributions. First, we provide a representative survey of
the security evaluation literature (Section 2); that is, those portions of the literature developing
quantiable measures of security capabilities. Works are chosen that collectively highlight the
trends and landmarks from each subdomain (IDS evaluation, cyber competition scoring, economic
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cost-benet analyses) allowing side-by-side comparison. We illustrate drawbacks and benecial
properties of these evaluations techniques.
Second, we propose a “unied” framework for evaluating security measures by modeling costs
of non-aack and aack states. By “unied”, we mean this approach provides the congurability to
be comprehensive in terms of the real-world factors that contribute to the models, and it is exible
enough to satisfy all three use cases. Specically, it incorporates the accuracy and performance,
which dominate IDS evaluation; the time to detection as well as the condentiality, integrity, and
availability of resources, favored by competitions’ metrics; and the dollar costs or resources, labor,
and aacks comprised by cost-benet analyses.
Our model, described in Section 3, is a cost model that can be congured for many diverse
scenarios, and permits a variety of granularity in modeling each component to accommodate
situations with ample/sparse information. Unlike many previous frameworks, ours uses a single,
easy-to-interpret metric, cost in dollars, and is readily analyzable as each component of this cost
uses a fairly simple model. As is commonplace for such economic models, nding accurate input
values (e.g., maximum possible cost of an aack, or the quantity of false alerts expected) is dicult
and a primary drawback of our and all previous similar models (see Section 2.3). In response, we
provide a sensitivity analysis is Section 3.3, to identify the model parameters/components that have
the greatest eect, so users know where to target eorts to increase accuracy—a practice that our
survey reveals is unfortunately rare.
We employ the new model in Section 4. As the driving force behind this research, we give a
detailed conguration of our cost model to be used as the evaluation procedure for an upcoming
IAPRA Challenge involving intrusion detection (Section 4.1). We provided simulated aack and
defense scenarios to test our scoring framework and exhibit results conrming that the evalua-
tion procedure encourages a balance of accuracy, timeliness, and resource costs. We expect our
simulation work can provide a baseline for future competitors.
As another example we congure this new model to evaluate the GraphPrints IDS from our
previous work [1]. is example shows the ecacy of the evaluation model from many viewpoints.
For researchers it provides an alternative to simple accuracy metrics, by incorporating the accuracy
ndings and resource costs into a realistic, quantiable cost framework. is allows, for example,
optimizing thresholds, accuracy, and performance considerations rather than just reporting each.
From the point of view of a security operation center (SOC), we provide an example of how to
evaluate a tool with the perspective of a potential purchase. Finally, we consider the model from a
vendor’s eye, and derive bounds for the potential licensing costs.
Overall, the main contributions of this work are (1) a survey of three distinct but related areas,
and (2) a general framework allowing computation and comparison of security that satises the
needs of all three use cases with examples of how this metric can be used.
2 RELATEDWORK: A SURVEY OF QUANTIFIABLE SECURITY EVALUATIONS
For related works, we focus on those that develop or use quantiable means to compare and
evaluate security capabilities. In this review, we found that evaluation of cyber security measures
has developed in three, rather independent threads. is section gives a survey of our ndings and
strives to be representative of the main ideas in each topic area. Since we cannot comprehensively
cite all related papers, we focus on papers with high impact or which illustrate particularly important
developments within their topic area.
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2.1 Evaluation of Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems
In the intrusion detection and prevention research, which focuses on evaluating and comparing
detection capabilities, researchers generally seek statistical evidence for detection accuracy and
computational viability as calculated on test datasets. While such evaluations are commonplace,
curation of convincing test sets and developing relevant metrics for ecacy in real-world use has
proven dicult. e default metrics employed, such as computational complexity for performance
and the usual accuracy metrics (e.g., true/false positive rate, precision, receiver operating character-
istic (ROC) curve, and area under the curve (AUC) to name a few) are indeed important statistics to
consider. Yet, these metrics cannot account for many important operational considerations, e.g.,
valuing earlier detection over later, valuing high-priority resources/data, or including the costs
of operators’ time. Research to incorporate these aspects is emerging, e.g. [2], but still does not
incorporate all of these real-world concerns. Oen the cost to implement the proposed security
measures in operations, e.g., hardships of training the algorithms on network-specic data or
conguration/reconguration costs, is either neglected or considered out of scope.
Further, validation of a proposed method requires data with known aacks and enough delity to
demonstrate the method’s abilities. In general, there is limited availability of real network datasets
with known aacks, and there is lile agreement on what qualities constitute a “good”, that is,
representative and realistic, dataset. is is exacerbated by privacy concerns that inhibit releasing
real data, and unique characteristics inherent to each network, which limits generalizability of
any given dataset. Notably, there are a small number of publicly available datasets, that have
catalyzed a large body of detection research, in spite of many of these datasets receiving ample
criticism. Notably, the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity provides 13 datasets that are useful for
meaningful, head-to-head validation hps://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/index.html. All of these data
sets and many others from the research literature appear in our related survey of host-based IDS
works [3]. In other cases, researchers oen use one-o, custom-made datasets, e.g. [1, 4]. While
this can potentially address some of the concerns above, these datasets generally are not made
publicly available, which sacrices reproducibility of results, inhibits meaningful comparison across
publications, and makes it dicult or impossible to verify the quality of these datasets.
2.1.1 DARPA Dataset. One of the earliest aempts to systematize this performance evaluation
was the DARPA 1998 dataset, which was originally used to evaluate performers in the 1998
DARPA/AFRL “Intrusion Detection Evaluation,” a
competition-style project. is dataset included both network and host data, including tcpdump
and list les, as well as BSM Audit data. e test network included thousands of simulated
machines, generating realistic trac in a variety of services, over a duration of several weeks; this
also included hundreds of aacks of 32 aack types [5]. Interestingly, results were measured in
“false alarms per day” (presumably the averaged per day in the dataset) not the raw false alarm rate
(number of false positives / number of negatives). is false alarm per day rate was compared with
the true positive rate in percent. e authors chose this representation of the false alarm rate to
emphasize the costs in terms of analysts’ time; however, future researchers generally used the raw
false alarm rate instead, since the two are directly proportional.
is was apparently the rst use of the ROC curve1 in intrusion detection, which has since
become a common practice. As the authors explain:
ROC curves for intrusion detection indicate how the detection rate changes as
internal thresholds are varied to generate more or fewer false alarms to tradeo
1Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) refers to the curve ploing the true positive versus false positive rate as the
detection threshold is varied.
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detection accuracy against analyst workload. Measuring the detection rate alone
only indicates the types of aacks that an intrusion detection system may detect.
Such measurements do not indicate the human workload required to analyze false
alarms generated by normal background trac. False alarm rates above hundreds
per day make a system almost unusable, even with high detection accuracy, because
putative detections or alerts generated can not be believed and security analysts
must spend many hours each day dismissing false alarms. Low false alarm rates
combined with high detection rates, however, mean that the putative detection
outputs can be trusted and that the human labor required to conrm detections is
minimized.
is dataset has faced various criticism for not being representative of real-world network
conditions. Some researchers have observed artifacts of the data creation, due to the simulated
environment used to generate this data, and explained how these artifacts could bias any detection
metrics [6]. Other researchers noted that high-visibility but low-impact probing and DoS aacks
made up a large proportion of the aacks in the dataset [7], giving them increased importance in
the scoring, while other work has criticized the aack taxonomy and scoring methodology [8].
2.1.2 KDD Cup 1999 dataset & evaluation. e KDD Cup competition was based on the same
original dataset as DARPA 98, but modied to include only the network-oriented features, and pre-
processed these into convenient collections of feature vectors. is resulted in a dataset consisting
essentially of ow data with some additional annotations. is simplied dataset was easier for
researchers to use and spawned a large variety of works which applied existing machine learning
techniques to this dataset [3].
In the performer evaluation, the scores were determined by nding the confusion matrix (number
of true/false positives/negatives) and multiplying each cell by a factor between 1 and 4. is
weighting did penalize false positives for the “user to root” and “remote to local” aack categories
more heavily than other types of mis-categorization; however, this was apparently to compensate
for the uneven sizes of the classes, and did not seem to consider any relative, real-world costs of false
positives versus false negatives, as these costs were discussed in neither the task description nor the
evaluation discussion. Other than these weights, the evaluation and the discussion of results placed
no particular emphasis on the impact to the operator, like the DARPA 98 evaluation discussed
above. Omiing any ROC curves also seemed to be a step backwards, although understandable
because not all submissions included a tunable parameter that this requires.
Overall, the performers achieved reasonable results, but none were overwhelmingly successful.
Notably, some very simple methods (e.g., nearest neighbor classier) performed nearly as well as
the winning entries [9].
Because it was derived from the DARPA dataset above, this dataset inherited many of the same
problems discussed earlier. In particular, Sabhnani & Serpen [10] note that it was very dicult for
performers to classify the user-to-root and remote-to-local categories:
Analysis results clearly suggest that no paern classication or machine learning
algorithm can be trained successfully with the KDD data set to perform misuse
detection for user-to-root or remote-to-local aack categories.
ese authors explain that the training and testing sets are too dierent (for these categories)
for any machine learning approach to be eective. Aer merging the training and test sets, they
re-tested using ve-fold cross validation to observe that the same methods on this modied dataset
resulted in vastly superior detection performance.
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Other researchers released variants of this dataset to address some of these problems, such as the
NSL-KDD dataset [11], which removed many redundant ows and created more balanced classes.
However, other problems still remain, and at this point the normal trac and the aacks are no
longer representative of modern networks.
2.1.3 Later Developments. Following the release of these early benchmark datasets, researchers
have generally focused on creating more recent and/or higher-quality datasets, and generally have
not focused on the methodology/metrics used in evaluation. Examples are the UNM dataset [12] of
system call traces for specic processes, the ADFA datasets [13] of Windows and Linux host audit
data, and the VAST competition 20122 and 20133 datasets, which focus on various network data
sources.
ere are many additional data sources which are now publicly available, but most are not
suitable as-is for training and testing these systems. Some are more specialized datasets, such as
the Active DNS Project [14], many contain only malicious trac, and some data sources are both
specialized and malicious, such as only containing peer-to-peer botnet command and control trac.
ere are much fewer examples of datasets of normal trac, although a few of them have been
released, such as CAIDA’s anonymized internet traces4. ese are generally either anonymized
and/or aggregated in some way (eg. ows versus packets, modifying addresses, etc.) that can
limit some types of analysis. More importantly, there is lile consensus on what “normal trac”
means, or what datasets would be representative of what networks. If these systems are deployed
on networks with dierent characteristics than the evaluation datasets, the performance could
dier signicantly. Some works have proposed criteria which high-quality datasets should strive to
achieve, but these are not universally accepted currently [15].
Because of these issues, current datasets can vary signicantly in quality, and most are awed
in some way. ere is currently no consensus on any general-purpose benchmark datasets, the
role which the DARPA and KDD datasets used to ll. is situation does seem to be gradually
improving over time, but for now these remain signicant issues.
2.1.4 CTU Botnet Dataset & Time-Dependent Accuracy Metrics. One notable recent contribution
presents both new
datasets as well as a new methodology for evaluating IDS performance for detecting botnet trac
from PCAPs5 or network ows6 [2]. e datasets contain a variety of individual malware PCAP
les, collected over long time frames, and also some collections of (real) background trac from a
university network. In addition, the authors discuss some important shortcomings of the generally-
used metrics, and propose some signicant improvements.
e classic error metrics were dened from a statistical point of view, and they fail
to address the detection needs of a network administrator.
To address this, they propose new criteria. For the accuracy metrics, the approach is to break the
data into time-windows and dene a confusion matrix (counts of true/false positives/negatives) for
each time-window, with increased emphasis for early detection. ey dene
correcting functionα (i) = e(−α i) + 1 (1)
2hp://www.vacommunity.org/VAST+Challenge+2012
3hp://www.vacommunity.org/VAST+Challenge+2013
4e CAIDA UCSD Anonymized Internet Traces hp://www.caida.org/data/passive/passive dataset.xml
5Captures of network packets
6Network ow data, or ows, are the meta-data of network communications, including but not limited to the source and
destination IPs, source and destination ports, protocol, timestamp, and quantities of information (bytes, packets, etc.) sent
in each direction.
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where i is the number of the time window, and α is an adjustable time-scaling parameter. is
correcting function is used to dene the time-dependent true positive TP(i), false negative FN (i),
true negativeTN (i), and false positive FP(i) quantities, dened below. In what follows, Nb (i) is the
number of unique botnet IP addresses and Nn(i) is the number of unique normal IP addresses in
the time frame i .
• Performance should be measured by addresses instead of ows. is is important because,
for example, one malware sample may generate much more command and control trac
than another, even while performing similar actions. is incidental dierence in behavior
should not articially impact the detection scores.
• When correctly detecting botnet trac, a True Positive, early detection is beer than laer.
– e number of true positives in time window i is CT P (i). ey dene “A True Positive
is accounted when a Botnet IP address is detected as Botnet at least once during the
comparison time frame.”
– e time-dependent quantity representing true positives in time window i is
TP(i) = CT P (i)(1 + e
(−α i))
Nb (i)
• When failing to detect actual botnet trac, a False Negative, an early miss is worse than
laer.
– e number of false negatives occurring in time window i is CFN (i). ey dene, “A
False Negative is accounted when a Botnet IP address is detected as Non-Botnet during
the whole comparison time frame.”
– e time-dependent quantity representing false negatives in time window i is
FN (i) = CFN (i)(1 + e
(−α i))
Nb (i) .
• e value of correctly labeling the non-botnet trac (True Negative) is not aected by
time.
– e number of true negatives occurring in time window i is CT N (i). ey dene “A
True Negative is accounted when a Normal IP address is detected as Non-Botnet during
the whole comparison time frame.”
– e time-dependent quantity representing true negatives in time window i is
TN (i) = CT N (i)
Nn(i) .
• e value of incorrectly alerting on normal trac (False Positive) is not aected by time.
– e number of false positives occurring in time window i is CF P (i). ey dene, “A
False Positive is accounted when a Normal IP address is detected as Botnet at least
once during the comparison time frame.”
– e time-dependent quantity representing false positives in time window i is
FP(i) = CF P (i)
Nn(i) .
Finally, the time-dependent accuracy metrics, e.g., true positive rate, precision, F1 score, accuracy,
etc. are dened as usual using the TN (i), FN (i),TP(i), FP(i) as dened above.
To summarize, detecting or failing to detect real botnet trac (or other aack trac) is time-
sensitive, while for normal trac it is not. Also, any number of alerts for ows that are related to
the same address should be aggregated into one item for evaluation purposes, since the analyst
is primarily concerned with the machine-level, and not directly concerned with the ow-level.
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Additionally, these authors dene new time-based measures of FPR, TPR, TNR, FNR, Presicion,
Accuracy, Error rate, and F1 score. ey provide a public tool to calculate these new scores [2]7.
See Section 4.1, where we compare these scores to others in a simulation of seven detectors.
2.1.5 Common Problems with ML Approaches. Sommer & Paxson [16] review the diculties in
using machine learning in intrusion detection, and help to explain why it has been less successful
when compared with other domains, such as optical character recognition (OCR). Some of the main
issues they highlight involve the lack of quality training data, specically insucient quantity of
data, training with one-class datasets, and non-representative data causing signicant problems.
Additionally they re-emphasize some important practical issues, such as the relatively high costs
of both false positives and false negatives, and the “semantic gap” referring to the diculty in
interpreting alerts. All of these factors result in diculties in performing evaluations, with the
simple statistical metrics of FP & FN rates being insucient, and real-world usability being more
important, but more dicult to measure. e authors emphasize that designing and performing
the evaluation is generally “more dicult than building the detector itself.”
A common problem for intrusion detection metrics is the base-rate fallacy; e.g., see Axelsson [17].
Concisely, the base-rate fallacy is the presence of both a low false positive rate (percentage of
negatives that are misclassied) but a high false alert rate (percentage of alerts are false positives,
equivalently, 1− precision). e base-rate fallacy is caused by high class imbalance, usually orders
of magnitude more negatives (normal data) than positives (aack data). at is, the denominator of
the false positive rate calculation is usually an enormous number; hence, for nearly any detector
the false positive rate can be exceptionally low. is can give a false sense of success and it means
that ROC curves are only in eect depicting the true positive rate. On the other hand, the false
alert rate, or simply quantity of false alerts are oen important to take into account.
eir overall conclusion is that the intrusion detection problem is fundamentally harder than
many other machine learning problem domains, and that while these techniques are still promising,
they must be applied carefully and appropriately to avoid these additional diculties.
2.1.6 Evaluating Other Tools. Most of these works discussed above focus on IDSs specically,
but these diculties also apply to IPSs, malware detection, and related problems. Similarly, these
apply regardless of the data source or architecture being considered—host-based, network-based,
virtual machine hypervisor-based, or other approaches.
Additionally, when evaluating other security-related systems, such as rewalls, SIEMs (security
information and event management systems), ticketing systems, etc., we encounter even more
diculty. Not only are there no widely accepted datasets, the relevant metrics and the testing
methodology are oen not considered systematically. Some of these factors, such as the user expe-
rience, integration with current workow and current tools, etc. are inherently harder to quantify,
and are oen organization-dependent. e situation at present is somewhat understandable, but
we maintain that a unied approach to evaluation should help in addressing these areas as well.
2.2 Evaluation criteria for cyber competitions
Red team & capture-the-ag (CTF) competitions exercise both oensive and defensive computing
capabilities. ese activities are commonly used as educational opportunities and for organizational
7hp://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/botnetdetectorscomparer/BotnetDetectorsComparer-0.9.tgz
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self assessment [18–23]8. ese competitions require a set of resources to be aacked and/or
defended and an evaluation criteria to determine winning teams (among other necessities).
In addition to traditional statistical evaluation metrics, the competitions integrate measures
of operational viability, such as, the duration or number of resources that remained condential,
unaltered (integrity measure), or functional (availability measure), in addition to statistical measures,
e.g., true positive rate, etc. For example, Patriciu & Furtuna [20] list the following scoring measures
for cyber competitions (for aackers:) the count of successful aacks, accesses to target system,
and number of successfully identied open services compared to the total number, an analogue
true positive rate, (for defenders:) true positive rates for detection (identication) and forensics
(classication), time duration to recover from an aack, and downtime of services.
While there is wide variety across competitions, the main trend in evaluation is to augment the
usual detection accuracy metrics with some measure of how well an operation remained healthy
and unaected. is greatly increases trust in the evaluation procedure because the eect of the
security measures on the operational objective are built into the metrics. We note that the object
under evaluation is usually the participants’ skill level, and that signicant eort is needed to
assemble the test environments. While cyber exercise publications oen focus on a combination of
pedegogy, design, implementation, etc., we only survey the scoring procedures.
Parallel to such competitions are red-team events and penetration testing as used by security
operation centers and soware development companies to assess weaknesses in security posture
and vulnerabilities in code. Penetration testing and red-team testing occupies its own space in the
literature, e.g., see [24–27], and automated penetration testing tools are becoming prevalent in the
commercial market, e.g., www.verodin.com/ www.aackiq.com/. ese works/technologies target
an enumeration of weaknesses, not a quantiable measure for head-to-head comparison—although
they can certainly feed such an evaluation! We note that DARPA has centered CTFs on the topic of
automated vulnerability analysis and patching, necessitating a scoring metric for this topic (see
https://
archive.darpa.mil/CyberGrandChallenge/). Below we discuss a few works that give
novel evaluation metrics for cyber competitions.
2.2.1 iCTF’s Aacker Evaluation. Doupe´ et al. [19] describes the 2010 International Capture
the Flag Competition (iCTF), which employed a novel “Eectiveness” score for each aacker. For
each service, s , and time t the binary functions C,D,OT , taking values in [0, 1], are dened as
follows: C(s, t) is a binary function that indicates criticality of service s at that time t ; specically, it
indicates if the function is in use for this application. D(s, t) encodes risk to an aacker, e.g., being
detected, and in this competition was simply the opposite bit as C , punishing aacks on unused
services. OT (s, t) is the indicator function for when C − D is positive and represents the “Optimal
Aacker”. For an aacker a, A(s, t ,a) ∈ [0, 1] represents the risk to service s by aacker a at time t .
Toxicity is dened as
T (a, s) =
∫
t
A(a, s, t)(C − D)(s, t)dt
a score that is increasing with the eectiveness of the aacker. Note that toxicity (T ) is maximal when
A = OT . Hence, the nal score is the normalized toxicity,T (a, s)/Z withZ (s) :=
∫
OT (C−D)(s, t)dt .
8Also see DOE’s cyber-physical defense competition hps://cyberdefense.anl.gov/about/, DefCon’s CTF hps://www.
defcon.org/html/links/dc-ctf.html, NCX (NSA’s) hps://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/cybersecurity/ncx/, National Collegiate
Cyber Defense Competition (NCCDC) (hp://www.nationalccdc.org/), and Mitre’s CTF (hp://mitrecyberacademy.org/
competitions/) among others.
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2.2.2 MIT-LL CTF’s CIA Score. Werther et al. [22] describes the MIT Lincoln Laboratory CTF
exercise, in which teams are tasked with protecting a server while compromising others’ servers.
A team’s defensive score is computed as
D :=
∑
x ∈{c,i,a }
Wxx ,
where
(1) c is the percent of the team’s ags not captured by other teams (condentiality),
(2) i is the percent of the team’s ags remaining unmodied (integrity), and
(3) a is the percent of successful functionality tests (availability).
WeightsW{c,i,a } allow exibility in this score. e oensive score is O := fraction of ags captured
from other teams’ servers, and the total score is
WdD + (1 −Wd )O,
with parameterWd ∈ (0, 1) encoding the tradeo between oensive and defensive scores. is is an
appealing metric because it intuitively captures all three facets of information security—condentiality,
integrity, availability.
2.2.3 DARPA’s Vulnerability Analysis & Patching Grand Challenge CTF Score. DARPA’s Grand
Challenge (archive.darpa.mil/
CyberGrandChallenge/) focused on vulnerability analysis and patching. Each team’s entry, a
fully autonomous “cyber reasoning system” (CRS) was connected to the referee server that served
potentially vulnerable services (binaries) simultaneously to each team’s CRS. Teams then had the
ability to discover vulnerabilities in these services and patch their instances, send “challenges”, that
is exploit code to prove a vulnerability exists in opponent’s binaries, and build network IDS rules to
protect their vulnerable binaries from others’ exploits. e competition is comprised of a sequence
of rounds, and scoring is administered for each CRS per service per round and then summed.
A CRS’s service score in a given round is computed as the product of availability, security, and
evaluation subscores. To achieve the availability subscore of a CRS’s service for a round, the referee
would test the service for proper functionality, which may be compromised by an opponents exploit,
and improper patch, or when the service is down because it is being patched. is score lies in the
range 0-100. e security subscore of a CRS’s service in a round is 2 unless the service was exploited
by an opponent, then it was decremented in that round to 1. Finally, the evaluation subscore of a
CRS’s service, 1+ xN , where N = 6 was the number of opponents, and x is the number of successful
“chalenge” exploits of that service in this round. [28] Also see www.phrack.org/papers/
cyber grand shellphish.html. Hence, those that could quickly identify and prove (exploit)
vulnerabilities as well as patch their own soware with lile down time were most rewarded.
We conclude with a major lesson for proposing quantiable evaluation frameworks that is
illustrated well by the DARPA challenge scoring—that the method used to reduce security to a
single number can promote undesirable security postures. For example, see a DARPA challenge
competitor’s web page9 where they claim to have simulated an entry that does nothing—that is, the
entry takes no actions to nd, patch, exploit or defend vulnerabilities—and concluded that this null
entry would have placed third in the competition. While this may be a desired result—e.g., perhaps
the current state of automated patching aects availability so much that it is not yet viable—it is a
rm reminder that quantitative evaluations are vulnerable to exploit themselves! In Section 4.1 we
9hp://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:r9zSUTMtXhIJ:www.phrack.org/papers/cyber grand
shellphish.html&hl=en&gl=us&strip=1&vwsrc=0
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provide an example of our model congured for a cyber competition, and we simulate a variety of
strategies to test its ecacy and ability to be ‘gamed’ by an unrealistic security strategy.
2.3 Cost-benefit analyses of security measures
ere is a robust literature that bloomed around 2005 providing quantiable cost-benet analysis
of security measures using applied economics. Arising from the tension between the operational
need for security and the organization’s budget constraints, these researches provide frameworks
for quantiable comparison of security measures. e clear goal of each work is assisting decision
makers (e.g., C-level ocers) in optimizing the security-versus-cost balance. To quote Leversage &
Byres [29],
One of the challenges network security professionals face is providing a simple yet
meaningful estimate of a system or network’s security preparedness to management,
who typically aren’t security professionals.
is goal is also emphasized in other, more general works on security metrics, such as Andrew
Jaquith’s book on security metrics[30] and NIST Special Publication 800-55[31]. ese both describe
how to choose or create suitable metrics for an organization, and how to relate these to the organiza-
tion’s mission. ese works focus on metrics which are easily measured and easily understandable,
such as the proportion of machines with a specic vulnerability, and then aggregating these into
higher-level metrics, such as the proportion of machines which are non-compliant with policy.
What dierentiates the following works is the focus on economic metrics and estimates which
should be applicable to any organization.
While many dierent models exist, overarching trends are to enumerate/estimate (a) internal
resources and their values, (b) adversarial actions (aacks) and their likelihood, and (c) security
measures’ costs and eects, then use a given model to produce a comparable metric for all combi-
nations of security measures in consideration. is subject bleeds from academic literature into
advisory reports from government agencies and companies [32, 33], textbooks for management
[34, 35], and security incident summary costs and statistic reports [36–38].
e main drawback is all proposed models rely on untenable inputs (e.g., likelihood of a certain
aack with and without a security tool in place) that are invariably estimated and oen impossible
to validate. Academic authors are generally open about this as are we. Perhaps surprisingly, our
survey of the literature did not identify use of sensitivity analysis to identify the most critical
assumptions, a reasonable step to identify which inputs are most inuential, especially when
validation of input assumptions is not possible. In response, for our model we provide such a
discussion in Section 3.3.
A prevalent, but less consequential drawback is a tendency to oversimplify for the sake of
quantication. is oen results from unprincipled conversions of incomparable metrics (e.g.,
reputation to lost revenue), or requiring users to rank importance of incomparable things. e
outcome is a single quantity that is simple to compare but hard to interpret.
User studies shows that circa 2006, many large organizations used such models as anecdotal
evidence to support intuitions on security decision [39]. e advantages are pragmatic—these
models leverage the knowledge of security experts and external security reports to (1) reason about
what combination of security measures is the “best bang for the buck”, and (2) they provide a
nancial justication required by chief nancial ocers to move forward with security expenditures
[32].
2.3.1 SAEM: Security Aribute Evaluation Method. Perhaps the earliest publication on cost-
benet analysis for information security, Butler [40] provides a detailed framework for estimating
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a threat index, which is a single value representing the many various expected consequences of an
aack. Working with an actual company, Butler describes examples of the many estimates in the
workow. Users are to list (1) all threats, e.g,. 28 aacks were enumerated by the company using
this framework each in three strengths, (2) all potential consequences with corresponding metrics,
e.g., loss of revenue measured in dollars, damaged reputation measured on a 0-6 scale, etc., and (3)
the impact of each aack on each consequence. Weights are assigned to translate the various cost
scales into a uniform “threat index” metric; note that this step allows a single number to represent
all consequences, but is hard to interpret. Next, the likelihood of each aack is estimated, and the
weighted average gives the threat index per aack. e per aack threat indices are summed to a
single, albeit hard-to-interpret number. By estimating the eect of a desired security measure on
the inputs to the model, analysts can see the plot of costs for each solution versus the change in
threat index. Notably, authors mention that uniformly optimistic or pessimistic estimates will not
change rankings of solutions, and suggest a sensitivity analysis, although none is performed.
2.3.2 ROSI: Return on Security Investment. Sonnenreich et al. [41] and Davis [42] discuss a
framework for estimating the Return on Security Investment (ROSI). e calculation requires
estimation of the Annual Loss Expected (ALE). Tsiakis et al. [43] provide three formulas for
estimatingALE. One example is to letOi be the set of aacks, I (Oi ) the cost of the aacks, F (Oi ) the
frequency of the aack, and then ALE =
∑
I (Oi )F (Oi ). ROSI is a formula to compute the percent
of security costs saved if implemented. It requires users to estimate the percent of risk mitigated M
by the security measure and the cost of measure C . en the expected costs are ALE ∗M −C , and
ROSI (the percent of cost returned) is (ALE ∗M −C)/C . ese authors expect estimate formulas to
vary per organization, point to public cost-of-security reports, e.g., [36] to assist estimation, and
suggest internal surveys to estimate parameters needed. ey go on to say that “accuracy of the
incident cost isn’t as important as a consistent methodology for calculating and reporting the cost”,
a dubious claim.
2.3.3 ISRAM: Information Security Risk Analysis Method. Karabacak [44] introduces ISRAM, a
survey procedure for estimating aack likelihood and cost, the two inputs of an ALE estimate. For
both aack likelihood and aack costs, a survey is proposed. Each survey question (producing
an answer which is a probability) is given a weight, and the weighted average in converted to a
threat index score, which is averaged across participants. e ALE score is the product of these
two averages.
2.3.4 Gordon-Loeb Model. Perhaps the most inuential model is that of Gordon and Loeb (GL
Model), which provides a principled mathematical bound on the maximum a company should
spend on security in terms of their estimated loss. See the 2002 paper [45] for the original model.
Work of Gordon et al. [46] extends the model to include external losses of consumers and other
rms (along with costs only to the private rm being modeled).
To formulate the GL model, let L denote the monetary value of loss from a potential cyber
incident, v the likelihood of that incident, and s(z) : [0, ∞) → (0,v] denote the likelihood of an
aack given z dollars are spent on security measures. Initial assumptions on s are that s(0) = v > 0,
s is twice dierentiable, and s strictly convex; e.g., s(z) = v exp(−az) for a > 0 is a particular
example. It follows thatvL is their ALE estimate. e goal is to optimize the expected cost, s(z)L−z
for z positive. In the initial work Gordon & Loeb show that for two classes of s satisfying the above
assumptions, z∗ :=argminz (s(z)L−z), the spending amount that minimizes expected costs, satises
z∗ ≤ L/e . (2)
at is, optimal security will cost no more than the 1/e ≈ 37% the expected loss of the aack [45]!
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Follow-on mathematical work has shown this bound to be sharp and valid for a much wider
class of functions s [47, 48]. Specically, the work of Baryshnikov [48] is particularly elegant with
mathematical results so striking they are worth a summary. Let X be the set of all security actions
a rm could enact, Z (A) the cost of a set of actions A ⊆ X , and S(A) the likelihood of an aack
aer actions A are enacted. Baryshinkov assumes enactable collections of actions are measurable,
and Z is a measure; this is a mild assumption and its real-world meaning is simply that the cost of
disjoint collections of security actions will be additive, i.e., Z (A1 Û∪A2) = Z (A1) + Z (A2). Next, S is
also a set function with S(A) interpreted as the likelihood of an aack aer actions A are enacted.
ere are two critical assumptions—
(1) S(A1 Û∪A2) = S(A1)S(A2), so indeed u := − log S is a measure.
(2) U is a non-atomic measure, i.e., any A can be broken into smaller U -measurable sets.
ese assumptions are made to satisfy the hypotheses of Lyapunov’s convexity theorem (see
[49, 50]). Finally, set
s(z0) = inf
Z (A)≤z0
S(A),
the likelihood of an aack given one has enacted the optimal set of security actions that cost less
than z0. Lyapunov’s theorem furnishes that the range of vector-valued measure (Z ,U ) is closed
and convex. e closedness, implies that for any z0 (amount of money spent), the optimal set of
counter measures exists, while the convexity can be used to show that the z∗ (the optimal cost)
satises the 37% rule (Equation 2)!
is dizzying sequence of mathematics is striking because it starts with few and seemingly
reasonable assumptions and proves the cost of optimal security is bounded by 37% of potential losses.
e conundrum of these results is they are deduced with no real-world knowledge of a particular
organizations, security actions, costs, or aacks. While the assumptions seem mathematically
reasonable, e.g. “s is convex” translates to “decreasing returns on investment (the rst dollar spent
yields more protection than the next)”, the result, the 37% rule, presupposes the solution to a critical
question—that for any given dollar amount, z, the optimal security measures with cost less than z will
be found. No method for nding an optimal set of measures is given or widely accepted.
Gordon et al. [51] focuses on “insights for utilizing the GL model in a practical seing”. Since
the model is formulated as optimizing a dierentiable function, the optimum occurs when s ′ = 1,
or equivalently, the increment of spending in which the marginal likelihood of aack is estimated
at 1 is the amount to spend. e authors work with a company as an example, and the company is
tasked with identifying resources to protect, the losses if each is breached, and change in likelihood
for each $1M spent. In practice this model mimics the many other works in the area. e burden is
on the company to estimate cost, likelihood, and ecacy of potential aacks and countermeasures,
and then the reasoning is straightforward. On the other hand, the 37% rule gives an indicator if an
organizations’ security expenses are non-optimal. See Section 4.1 for an application.
2.3.5 Leversage & Byres’ Mean Time to Compromise Estimate. Research by Leversage & Byres
[29] uses the analogy of burglary ratings of safes, which is given in terms of time needed for
one to physically break into the safe, as a way to quantify security. Specically, the research
seeks an estimate of the average time to compromise system. Network assets are divided into
zones of protection levels and network connectedness is used to create an aack graph using
some simplifying assumptions, e.g., a target device cannot be compromised from outside its zone.
Aackers are classied into three skill levels, and functions are estimated that produce the time to
compromise assets given the aacker’s level and other needed estimates, such as, average number
of vulnerabilities per zone. Finally, a mean time to compromise can be estimated for each adversary
level using the paths in the aack graph to targets and estimated time functions. While this model
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still requires critical inputs that lack validated methods to estimate, the work addresses the problem
of quantifying security in a dierent light. Unlike the other models discussed here, it embodies
the fact that time is an extremely important aspect of security for two reasons: (1) e more
adversarial resources are needed to successfully compromise a resource, the less likely they are
to pursue/succeed; (2) e more time and actions needed between initial compromise and target
compromise, the more chance of detection and prevention before the target is breached [37].
2.3.6 Other works on quantifying security. Tangential to the three research areas discussed above
are various researches and non-academic reports that address quantiability of security.
Vendor and government reports are common resources for estimating costs based on historical
evidence. Broad statistics about the cost and prevalence of security breaches are provided annually
by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [36]. More useful for estimating costs of a breach
are industry reports that provide statistics conditioned on location, time, etc. [32, 33, 37, 38, 52].
Notably, Ponemon’s Cyber Cost report gives the average monetary cost per record compromised
per country per year—$225 & $233 per record in the US in 2017, 2018 respectively they report—an
essential estimate for all economic models above. Further, Ponemon’s reports that if the mean time
to compromise (MTTC) was under 30 days, the average increase total cost was nearly $1M less
than breaches with MTTC greater than 30 days.
Acquisiti et al. [53] seek the cost of privacy breaches through statistical analysis of the stock
prices of many rms in the time window surrounding a breach. eir conclusion is short-term
negative eects are statistically signicant, but longer term are not.
See Rowe & Gallaher [39] for results of a series of interviews with organizations on how security
investments decisions are made (circa 2006). Anderson & Moore [54] provide a 2006 panoramic
review of the diverse trends and disciplines inuencing information security economics.
Verendel [55] provides a very extensive pre-2008 survey of researches seeking to quantify security,
concluding that “quantied security is a weak hypothesis”. at is to say, the methods proposed
lack repeated testing resulting in renement of hypotheses and ultimately validation through
corroboration.
3 NEW EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
Our goal is to provide a comprehensive framework for accruing security costs that can be exible
enough to accommodate most if not all use cases by modeling and estimating costs of defensive and
oensive measures modularly. In particular, we target the use case of comparing tools, procedures,
or operators, e.g. and especially, for security operation centers and cyber competitions. By
design the model balances the accuracy of detection and prevention capabilities, the resources
required (hardware, soware, and human), and the timeliness of detection and incident response.
Viewed alternatively, the model permits cost estimates for true negative (not under aack), true
positive (triage and response costs), false negative (under aack without action), and false positive
(unnecessary investigative) states.
Our approach can be seen as adopting the same general cost-benet framework as the works
in Section 2.3, and incorporating the more specic metrics described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 to
address the other two use cases, namely IDS evaluation and competition events. More specically,
to evaluate the impact of any technology, policy, or practice, we estimate the change in the total
cost (CTotal) by estimating the costs of breaches (
∑
CBreachi ) and the cost of all network defenses
(CDefense). e costs of network defense (CDefense) can be considered a combination of labor costs
CL and resource costs CR.
CTotal =
∑
CBreachi +CDefense. (3)
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e aack cost,
∑
CBreachi is analogous to the Annual Loss Expected (ALE) following Section 2.3,
with the dierence being that
∑
CBreachi covers an arbitrary time period, and can include actual or
estimated losses. Note that these breach costs include both direct costs (monetary or intellectual
property losses) as well as less direct losses such as reputation loss, legal costs, etc. Defense costs
CDefense include all costs of installing, conguring, running, and using all security mechanisms and
policies. While eective defenses will reduce the number of breaches expected, eective incident
response will reduce the impact (and therefore the cost) of any specic breach CBreachi , so both
approaches would be expected to reduce
∑
CBreachi , at the cost of somewhat increasing CDefense.
e defense cost includes both resource costs and labor costs. Both of these will generally include
up-front as well as ongoing costs. Ongoing costs can vary over time, and can depend on adversary
actions, because analysts will be reacting to adversary actions when detected.
When comparing security tools and/or procedures, we strive to incorporate the total costs of all
candidate systems, meaning the defense costs CDefense plus the projected breach costs
∑
CBreachi
above. A typical analysis might compare a baseline of no defenses, (meaning CDefense = 0 and
maximal
∑
CBreachi ,) versus current practices, versus new proposed system(s). e total costs (CTotal)
will be positive in all cases, but successful approaches will minimize this total.
For a simple example, consider an enterprise implementing a policy that all on-network computers
must have a particular host-based anti-virus alerting and blocking system. Such a change will incur
an upfront licensing fee, costs of hardware needed to store and process alerts, labor costs for the
time spent installing and conguring, time spent responding to alerts, and a constant accrual of
costs in terms of memory, CPU, and HD use per host per hour. However, these CDefense costs will
presumably be oset by a reduced
∑
CBreachi . Estimating all of these costs included in CDefense is
relatively simple, however estimating
∑
CBreachi is more dicult.
We rely on many of the same cost estimates as the works in Section 2.3, which does present some
practical diculties, especially when estimating probability or costs of an aack. While a clear
drawback, these diculties in estimation are unavoidable. We make two concessions: (1) First, this
is oen not a hindrance when using the model for comparison of similar tools/procedures. When
populating inputs with estimates (e.g., aack cost or host resource costs), inaccurate input values
may indeed invalidate the accuracy of the output value (that is, the actual overall cost may be
incorrect), but when comparing similar tools/procedures, the ranking provided by our cost model
will be accurate even if the exact estimated costs are not (provided the input cost estimates are held
constant across the instantiations of the model). Furthermore, we provide estimates for costs based
on research to be used as defaults in Section 3.4. (2) Second, we provide a sensitivity analysis in
Section 3.3 that illuminates the aect of each parameter. is provides guidance to the user on what
estimates should be most accurate, or, if a user cannot accurately estimate inuential parameters,
they can at least vary these parameters within an acceptable range to gauge results.
e main benet of the approach is the exibility. is approach can be applied to a wide variety
of technology, procedural, or policy changes and compare them head-to-head. For example, one may
wish to compare a new SIEM, which bears large initial costs in terms of licensing, conguration, and
training but enhances eciency of operators, to a new procedure for handing o incidents between
operators to increase eciency, to a new IDS that will increase accuracy of alerts. Admiedly, in
our examples we are primarily considering the case of IDS evaluation. (Specic examples for using
the model for such evaluations are the topic of Section 4.)
is section denes and itemizes aack and defense costs in Subsections 3.1 & 3.2. We strive for
relatively ne-grained treatment of costs (e.g., breaking aack cost models into kill-chain phases),
permiing one to drill down into costs if their data/estimates permit detailed analysis, or to stay at
a more general level and model with coarser granularity. Subsection 3.3 describes how these are
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combined, and this section concludes with our estimates for quantifying the main components in
Subsection 3.4.
3.1 Aacks and Breaches: Definition and Cost Model
We dene a “breach” as any successful action by an aacker that compromises any of the familiar
triad of condentiality, integrity, or availability. In our examples, we primarily consider the costs of
losing condentiality and integrity, but losses of availability also have measurable and potentially
signicant costs. e relative importance of these potential costs will be highly dependent on the
organization.
Building on this, we consider an “aack” to be a series of actions which, if successful, will lead
to a loss or corruption of data or resources. e aack begins with the rst actions that could lead
to this loss, and the aack ends when these are no longer threatened. For example, an aacker may
re-try a failed action several times before adapting or giving up, and this would all be considered
part of the same aack. An aack can potentially be thwarted by both automated tools and manual
response of the SOC.
If each aack were instead viewed as one atomic event, this type of reaction by network defenders
would not be possible within that framework; however, real aacks almost always involve a
sequence of potentially-detectable aacker actions. For example, the “cyber kill chain” model [56]
describes a seven-phase model of the aacker’s process, beginning with reconnaissance, continuing
through exploitation, command and control, and ending with the aacker completing whatever
nal objectives they may have. At that point, the breach is successful. As the authors describe:
e essence of an intrusion is that the aggressor must develop a payload to breach
a trusted boundary, establish a presence inside a trusted environment, and from
that presence, take actions towards their objectives, be they moving laterally inside
the environment or violating the condentiality, integrity, or availability of a
system in the environment. e intrusion kill chain is dened as reconnaissance,
weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control (C2), and
actions on objectives.
e authors later describe how this model can map specic countermeasures to each of these steps
taken by an adversary, and how this model can be used to aid in other areas such as forensics and
aribution.
Other authors have expanded this kill chain model to related domains such as cyber-physical
systems [57] or proposing related approaches based on the same insights [58]. e creators of the
STIX model discuss this kill-chain approach in some depth when presenting their STIX knowledge
representation [59]. ey dene a “campaign” as “a set of aacks over a period of time against a
specic set of targets to achieve some objective.”
Our denitions of “aack” and “breach”, discussed above, is a simplied view of these same
paerns. In this case, the specic sequence of actions is less important than the general paern: an
“aack” consists of a series of observable events, which potentially leads to a “breach” if successful.
e events that make up an aack can be grouped into “phases”, where one phase consists of
similar events, and ends when the aacker succeeds in progressing towards their objectives. An
example would be dividing the aack into seven phases corresponding to the kill chain above;
however, we generally make no assumptions about what may be involved in each phase, or how
much time may occur between each phase, only that they occur sequentially, and that succeeding
in one phase is a prerequisite for the next. Also note that because of how “aack” and “breach” are
dened, the user has the option to combine or separate related aacks in whatever way is most
intuitive or convenient, for example modeling an APT campaign either as one long aack with
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one overall objective, or else a series of more conventional shorter aacks each with more limited
objectives. Either approach should produce equivalent results.
3.1.1 Breach Costs Model, CBreach. e general paern for the aack is that each phase incurs
a higher cost than the previous phase, until the maximum cost is reached when the aacker
succeeds. Within each phase, the cost begins at some initial value, then increases over time until it
reaches some maximum value for that phase. Consider an aacker with user-level access to some
compromised host. Initially, the aacker may make quick progress in establishing one or more
forms of persistence, gathering information on that compromised system, evaluating what data it
contains, etc. However, over time the aacker will make maximal use of that system, and will need
to move on to some other phase to continue towards their objectives.
Fig. 1. Plot of a proposed cost Cphase(t ;a,b,α) := b/(1 + c exp(−αt)) versus time t for one phase of an aack,
where c = b/a − 1 with a the starting cost at t = 0, b the maximal cost (limit in time), and term α determines
how quickly this maximum cost is approached.
To model the phase of an aack we simply require a cost function that increases over time and
asymptotically approaches the maximum cost; at it’s most basic, this can simply be a step function
indicating the full cost was incurred at the moment of the aack. For a more exible model, the
cost versus time for any phase of the aack can be seen in Figure 1, as represented by the equation
Cphase(t ;a,b,α) := b/(1 + c exp(−αt)), where c = b/a − 1 with a the starting cost at t = 0, b the
maximal cost (limit in time), and term α determines how quickly this maximum cost is approached.
In the worst case, where α is relatively large, this cost versus time curve is approximately a step
function.
Because an aack is composed of several of these phases, if we assume that each phase is more
severe and more costly than the previous, we can view the cost versus time for the aack overall as
seen in Figure 2. is can be represented by a sum of the cost of all phases, which using the equation
above would be CBreach(t) = ∑Cphasei (t − ti ) with phase i beginning at time ti . As t increases, this
will approach the maximum cost for this breach.
is model is craed to give exibility based on the situation. In cases where we have sucient
data on a real aack, this approximation may be unneeded, and one can replace the curves above
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Fig. 2. Plot of cost versus time for a proposed model of all phases of an aack, specifically, CBreach(t) =∑
Cphasei (t − ti ) with phase i beginning at time ti .
Fig. 3. Plot of an proposed S-curve estimate of aack cost CBreach(t) = b exp(−α/t2) and corresponding
marginal cost (derivative) 2αb exp(−α/t2)/t3 ignoring individual phases of an aack.
with observed costs for each phase. On the other hand, when estimating cost of a general aack
without specic cost versus time data, we propose two options. First, one may consider estimating
each phase’s cost as constant and estimate the aack as a series of steps (eectively leing each
phase’s α →∞ in the proposed cost models above). Secondly, one may ignore the individual phases
and approximate the total cost of the aack as an S-curve, such as b exp(−α/t2), where b denotes
the maximal cost of an aack over time, and α controls how fast the aack cost approaches b. See
Figure 3.
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is second approach is useful when the total cost of a breach can be estimated, but the individual
phases of an aack either cannot be modeled well or are not the primary concern. For example,
this approach may be more useful when estimating future breach costs for planning purposes.
Intuitively, this cost estimation gives a marginal cost of 2αb exp(−α/t2)/t3, a skewed bell curve. e
shape of this curve matches the intuitively expected costs for a common aack paern—beginning
with low-severity events such as reconnaissance, reaching maximum marginal cost as the aack
moves laterally, exltrates data, or achieves its main objectives, and then tapers o the accrual of
costs. at is, over time, aer the main objectives have been completed, and the maximum cost
is being approached, the aack will again reach a lower marginal cost simply because few or no
aacker objectives remain. To view this another way, this model captures the common-sense view
that aacks should be stopped as early as possible, and that stopping an aack aer it has largely
succeeded provides lile value. Interestingly, modeling a particularly slow-moving aacker, or a
particularly fast one, can be achieved by varying α . In practice one would t the two parameters to
their data/estimates. Examples are given in Section 3.4.1 and 4.1.
3.2 Defense Cost Model
As mentioned above, the total costs include both the breach costs, discussed above in 3.1, as well as
the defense costs, CDefense. is defense cost can be split into labor and resource (e.g., hardware)
costs, denoted CL, CR, respectively,
CDefense = CL +CR. (4)
Both the labor costs and resource costs can be sub-divided into several terms for easier estimation.
ese can represented as a sum of the following:
• initial costs, CI, covering initial install, conguration, and related tasks,
• baseline costs, CB, covering ongoing, normal operation when no alerts are present,
• alert triage costs, CT, representing the cost of determining if an alert is a true positive or a
false positive,
• incident response costs, CIR, representing the costs of responding to a real incident aer it
is detected and triaged.
is can be summarized as the following equations:
CL = CIL +CBL +CTL +CIRL (5)
CR = CIR +CBR +CTR +CIRR (6)
3.2.1 Labor Cost Model, CL . Labor costs of analyst time and other technical sta time are a
signicant cost for many organizations. ese costs can be sub-divided as described above, into
initial costs, baseline costs, triage costs, and incident response costs, which allows the labor costs to
be related directly to the sensor behavior and the status of any aacks. See Table 1 with functional
models to accompany these descriptions.
e initial labor costs,CIL , covers any initial installation, conguration, and all related tasks such
as creating/updating any documentation. is also includes the costs of any required training for
both analysts and end users.
e baseline labor costs, CBL , covers normal operation when no alerts are present. is would
include any patching, routine re-conguration, etc.
e alert triage labor costs,CTL , represents the cost of determining if an alert is a true positive or
a false positive. Note that the time needed to triage any alerts can depend signicantly on their inter-
pretability. For example, an alert giving “anomalous flow from IP <X>, port <x> to
IP <Y>, port <y>” would be less useful than “Unusually low entropy for port
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22(ssh),
this indicates un-encrypted traffic where
not expected”.
e incident response labor costs,CIRL , represents the costs of responding to a real incident aer
it is detected and triaged. e actual cost of this can vary over a large range, but we can make many
similar observations as in Section 3.1.1—the aack can be considered a series of discrete events,
grouped into phases of escalating severity and cost, and that each phase reaches some maximum
cost before potentially advancing to the next phase. Overall, we can model the costs of incident
response with a sigmoid function, similar to the aack costs model: CIRL (t) = b exp(−α/t2), with
parameters α ,b t to incident response costs data if available. Like the aack costs model, if we
have data from an actual observed aack, we then no longer need this model, and can calculate
this cost directly from available information.
If there is any noticeable burden or productivity impact to the end user, this must also be included.
ese costs can be categorized in the same way as above. e initial costs would include the costs
of any required setup and training, as mentioned previously. e baseline costs would include any
possible impact on the end user from normal operation, such as updating credentials, maintaining
two-factor authentication, etc. Triage costs could in principle apply to both analysts and end users;
however, generally end users will not be involved in or aware of this process, so in most cases
this would not contribute to costs. Incident response may also impact users, for example due to
re-imaging machines, or due to network resources being unavailable during the response. Like
above, the impact on users can either be calculated based on real event data, or estimated using a
similar model as the analysts’ costs.
3.2.2 Resource Cost Model, CR . Resource costs are another signicant component of overall
costs of network defense. ese can be broken down similarly to the labor costs above, into initial
costs CIR , baseline costs CBR , triage costs CTR , and incident response costs CIRR . As shown in Table
2 these resource costs can also be sub-divided by resource type. is specicity helps in estimating
costs and in relating costs to IDS performance and aack status.
e sub-categories of resources considered include the following:
• Licensing - In most cases this will either be free, xed cost, or a subscription based cost
covering some time period. However, this also could potentially involve a cost per host,
cost per data volume, or some other system. is will be a signicant cost in many cases.
• Storage - is is one of the easier costs to estimate; this increases approximately linearly
with data volume. is will generally be a function of the number of alerts generated, or
a function of time if more routine information is being logged, such as logging all DNS
trac.
Table 1. Labor Costs
Notation (Cost) Analysts End Users
CIL (Initial) c1 c2
CBL (Baseline) x1t x2t
CTL (Triage) y1n 0
CIRL (Incident Response)
∑
fi (t) ∑ fi (t)
Table of labor costs for analysts and end users. Note that
fi (t) is the cost estimate function, and is not needed if
real cost data is available.
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Table 2. Resource Costs
Notation (Cost) Licensing Storage CPU Memory Disk IO Bandwidth Space Power
CIR (Initial) c1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CBR (Baseline) x1t x2t x3t x4t x5t x6t x7t x8t
CTR (Triage) 0 y1n 0 0 y2n y3n 0 0
CIRR (Incident Response) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table of resource costs for each component of CR, as described in Section 3.2.2.
• CPU - e computational costs of analysis, aer data is collected, will (hopefully) scale
approximately linearly with the data volume. is cost can vary based on algorithm,
indexing approach, and many other factors. is is a function of time, and does not
generally depend on the number of alerts, unless considering some process that specically
ingests alerts, e.g., security information and event management (SIEM) systems. ere are
additional costs of instrumentation and collecting data, for example capturing full system
call records will impose some non-trivial cost on the host. Most end-users are not CPU
bound under normal workloads, so this cost is minimal as long as it’s under some threshold.
In a cloud environment, this may be included in their billing model, or if self-hosting this
will reduce the ability to oversubscribe resources, so in either of these cases the costs will
be more direct.
• Memory - ere is some memory cost required for analysis and indexing. is is generally
a function of time, or in some cases a function of the number of alerts. ere is also some
memory cost for collection on the host. Like CPU costs on the host, most physical machines
are over-provisioned, so costs are minimal if under some threshold. In a cloud environment,
this will typically be a linear cost per time.
• Disk IO - ese costs are generally a function of time and/or a function of the number
of alerts. is cost is not a major concern until it passes some threshold where it impacts
performance on either a server or the user’s environment.
• Bandwidth - Like Disk IO, these costs are a function of time and of the number of alerts.
is is also not a major concern until it passes some threshold that causes performance
degradation.
• Datacenter Space - While in practice this is a large up-front capital cost, it would typically
make sense to consider any appliances as ‘leasing’ space from the datacenter. Optionally,
the rate set may account for how much of the datacenter’s capacity is currently used, so
that space in an underutilized datacenter is considered a lower cost. In commercial cloud
environments, this is not a directly visible cost, but is included in other hosting costs.
• Power and Cooling - ese costs are similar to the costs of datacenter space discussed
previously, except that representing the costs as a function of time is more direct. In
most cases this is not a major concern, but it could be in some cases, and is included for
completeness.
Initial costs CIR would primarily consist of licensing fees and hardware purchases, as needed.
Hardware purchases and related capital costs, such as datacenter capacity, can be either included in
the initial costs or averaged over their expected lifespan, which would be captured in the baseline
costs CBR . Either is acceptable, as long as they are not over- or under-counted.
Baseline costs CBR represent the cost of normal operation, when no alerts are being generated.
is may include licensing costs, if those are on a subscription basis. is also would oen include
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storage, CPU, memory, datacenter costs, and related costs, in cases where hardware costs are
amortized over time, or in cases where cloud services are used, and these resources are billed based
on usage. is case is what is shown in Table 2.
Alert triage costs CTR represent costs of servicing and triaging alerts, above the baseline costs of
normal operation. is is potentially a labor-intensive process, but generally imposes lile or no
direct resource costs in terms of CPU, memory, etc. e amount of storage and bandwidth needed
for each alert is extremely small, and is not signicant until alert volumes become much higher than
analysts could reasonably handle. ere are some exceptions, such as large volumes of low-priority
alerts, or unusual licensing arrangements, so these costs are included for completeness.
Incident response costs CIRR represent the costs of actually responding to a known aack. Like
the triage costs, this is labor-intensive, but involves lile or no direct resource costs outside of
highly unusual circumstances. is is included here simply for completeness.
3.3 Full Model & Parameter Analysis
Following this discussion in Section 3.2, we can now replaceCDefense with these terms, and represent
CTotal as the following:
CTotal =
∑
i
CBreachi +CIL +CIR +CBL +CBR
+CTL +CTR +CIRL +CIRR
(7)
As with all cost-benet models, the primary downfall is estimating input parameters; e.g.,
populating CBreach(t) requires estimating the full impact of a future breach over time, an inherently
imprecise endeavor. While we give some defaults and examples for many of the estimates in
Sections 3.4 and 4, here we give a broad overview of sensitivity of the model to the parameters
allowing users to target estimation eorts to those inputs that are most inuential.
Terms CIR and CIL are constants; hence, unless for some particular situation they are very large,
they will not cause large eect when estimating costs over long time spans. Ongoing costs, CBL
and CBR are linear, increasing functions of time. ese will generally have a greater eect than
the constant one-time costs. In some cases these can be an outstanding contributor, but for most
applications we expect them to be less inuential than aack, triage, response costs.
Triage costs, CTL and CTR , are linear, increasing functions of the number of alerts, and incident
response costs, CI RL and CI RR are linear, increasing functions of the number of incidents and their
cost. ese are potentially very inuential on the nal costs. We note importantly that hidden
variables are the false positive and true positive rates/quantities. e nal costs of a security
measure can vary widely with quantities of alerts and the accuracy of detectors, so these terms are
very inuential. is is supported by our examples where costs incurred by the quantity of false
positives drastically vary overall costs.
Finally, CI RL and breach costs (aack models) are potentially non-linear in time. Consequently,
they are the most inuential parameters, along with hidden parameters “how oen do we expect to
be aacked?” and “what type of aacks do we expect?” As a quick example, the Ponemon’s 2018
Report [52] gives statistics for breach costs, but also separate gures “mega breach costs” with the
dierence being two orders of magnitude in cost. Changing an aack or response model based on
these two dierent estimates could potentially change total costs on the order of $100M!
In summary, for most applications, estimates of aack, incident response and triage costs will
be most inuential parameters. Importantly, estimating these requires latent variables such as
true/false positive rates, which are in turn very inuential.
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3.4 antifying Costs
When cost data or information on the eects of actual aacks are available, the cost model’s
parameters can be computed relatively precisely. When this data is not available, such as when
evaluating a new product or scoring a competition, general estimates are available using prevailing
wage information, cloud hosting rates, and similar sources. To aid in application of the model,
this section provides examples and reference values for the cost models introduced earlier in the
section.
3.4.1 Breach costs. e costs of breaches (
∑
CBreachi ) can be estimated based on historical data,
data aggregated from other organizations, and an estimate of the value of the data being protected.
For example, if a single host is infected with ransomware, it may simply need to be re-imaged, and
the cost of this may be simple to estimate from labor costs to reimage a host (assuming that no
data was exltrated as part of the aack). If a more advanced adversary can inltrate the network,
and they persist for long enough to nd and exltrate valuable data, the cost of the breach rises
dramatically aer the adversary begins to steal data. Modeling costs of such an aack will require
estimates of the worth of the data in the organization and/or can rely on historical reports of similar
breaches.
Using reports on breach costs from 2018, we provide an example of how to estimate an S-curve
model (Section 3.1) of costs induced by an aack. Ponemon’s Institute provides a yearly report
giving statistics on data breach costs and related statistics [33, 37, 52]. From the 2018 report we
nd “e mean time to identify [a breach] was 197 days,” and containing a breach in less than
30 days resulted in an average $3.09M cost, while containment taking greater than 30 days cost
$4.25M. We use these facts to t f (t) = b exp(−α/t2), the cost in $M of a breach given discovery
and containment occurred at t days. As no statistics are given about the distribution of time to
discovery, we use the given average, 197 days as a default detection time in our calculations. From
the statement that containment taking greater than 30 days cost $4.25M we obtain
lim
t→∞
∫ 197+30+t
197+30 f (x)dx
t
= 4.25.
For large t , f (t) ≈ b, hence the limit on the le approaches b, giving b =$4.25M. Next, from the
second piece of data we have ∫ 197+30
197 f (x)dx
30 = 3.09.
By numerically solving we can obtain α ≈ 12007.3.
Altogether our ed S-curve breach cost model is
f (t) = 4.25 exp(−12007.3/t2). See Figure 4.
Further examples of aack cost estimates are given in Section 4.1.
3.4.2 Resource costs. Many of the resource costs described in Section 3.2.2 involve datacenter
and hosting costs. If these are unknown for a particular organization, calculating pricing based on
cloud hosting provides a real-world default for these costs. ese costs are readily available from
cloud hosting providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS)10.
As shown in Table 3, these costs primarily depend on the volume of data generated, and the
amount of computational and memory resources needed for processing this volume of data. Table
3 only includes AWS bandwidth costs, which does not charge for uploading data to their cloud
services. is does not include any costs from the ISP or other bandwidth costs. Of course in a
10hps://aws.amazon.com/pricing/
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Fig. 4. Plot of f (t) = 4.25 exp(−12007.3/t2), the S-curve estimate of aack cost given assumptions derived
from Ponemon’s 2018 data [52].
Table 3. Estimates of Resource Costs
Notation (Cost) Storage CPU & Memory Bandwidth
CIR (Initial) 0 0 0
CBR (Baseline) $0.10 per GB per month $20 per instance per month 0
CTR (Triage) $0.10 per GB per month 0 $0.09 per GB out
CIRR (Incident Response) 0 0 0
Table of estimated resource costs, assuming and only taking into account cloud hosting fees. is is calculated
assuming long-term use of reserved t3.large AWS instances with EBS SSD at current (2018) prices. For real-
world scenariosCBR Bandwidth would include prices for internet service, etc, and subscriptions depending on
data volume (e.g. Splunk SIEM tool) fees would need to be added.
real-world scenario, a price for uploading data would be incurred, although not by AWS, but through
bills for internet service, power, etc. is also assumes no soware licensing costs—some licenses,
such as Splunk (hps://www.splunk.com) a popular SIEM system, can signicantly increase in cost
based on data volume.
As noted in an earlier study of SOCs [60]:
Reported size of host data varied widely … On the low end an approximation of
300MB/day were given. One respondent works across many organizations and
reported 100GB to 10TB per day, with the laer the largest estimate given during
our surveys … Overall, Splunk subscription costs were cited directly by some as
the constraint for data collection aer mentioning they would benet from more
data collection. Perhaps this is unsurprising given estimates from the numbers
above—the sheer quantity of host data collected and available to security operator
centers is between 1GB-1TB/day, stored for 3 months ≈ 100days = 100GB-100TB.
Combining the gures in the quote above with the costs from Table 3 results in baseline storage
costs ranging from $10 to $10,000 per month; this shows that even though storage and bandwidth
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Table 4. Estimates of Labor Costs
Notation (Cost) Analysts
CIL (Initial) 0
CBL (Baseline) 0
CTL (Triage) $80 per alert
CIRL (Incident Response) $400 per incident
Table of estimated labor costs for analysts. is as-
sumes lile or no impact on end users, which may
not be true in all organizations.
costs are very low per unit, they can be substantial across a large organization depending on what
sources are collected.
3.4.3 Estimates of Labor costs. Current estimates place the average analyst salary at around
$75k to $80k per year11 (about $35 to $38 per hour). is gure does not include benets, which
generally make up 30 or 40 percent of total compensation12, does not include any bonuses or other
non-salary compensation, and does not include any overhead costs. In the absence of any more
detailed information, an estimate of $70 per hour may currently be a reasonable starting point
when including benets and allowing some padding for other overhead.
Our interaction with SOC operators indicates that tens of thousands of alerts per month are
automatically handled (e.g., an AV ring and quarantining a le), but a much smaller minority
require manual investigation, usually tracked through a ticketing system. A typical ticketed
alert requires several minutes to triage by tier 1 analysts, and if escalated can require hours (or
potentially days) to fully investigate and remediate according to some published sources [61, 62].
Our interaction with SOC operators indicated that tier 1 analysts spend about 10 minutes per ticketed
alert, that tier 2 analysts use up to 2 hours, and tier 3 analysts time is potentially unbounded. If
we assume that 50% of alerts can be triaged and resolved by tier 1 analysts13, in an average of 10
minutes, and that additional investigation by higher tiers takes an average of 2 hours, that means
an average alert would cost approximately 10 minutes at $70/hr ($11.67) + 50% × 2 hours × $70/hr
($70), or about $80 in total.
Aer triage, the incident response begins, i.e., handling cleanup, mitigation, and related tasks
aer an aack. Section 3.2.1 proposes an S curve of increasing cost over time, and with some
information on costs of incident clean up one could t an S curve similar to the example in Section
3.4.1. For a simpler model, if we assume an average of 6 hours for incident response at $70/hr, we
obtain a cost of $420 or about $400.
4 EXAMPLES
Here we provide specic examples of the using the framework. e rst example explains estimates
and conguration of the framework for an upcoming IARPA grand challenge, a cyber competition
and the target application driving this research. Secondly, we evaluate a detection algorithm
proposed in our previous work as though it was to be deployed. e second application gives
11See www.glassdoor.com salaries for “Cyber Security Analyst” and “Information Security Analyst” titles.
12See www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf Table A.
13In reality, this gure may be signicantly lower; we consulted a few SOC operators who reported about 90% of ticketed
alerts advance to tier 2 analysts. is is highly dependent on the organization, the source of the alerts, and the false positive
rate.
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examples of how the evaluation framework is useful from the point of view of the researcher in
developing novel tools/algorithms, from the SOC in considering purchase of a new tool, and from a
vendor deciding the worth of their product.
4.1 VirtUE Contegrity Breach Detection Challenge
A target application of this framework is evaluating detection capabilities for a competition as part
of the IARPA VirtUE (Virtuous User Environment) research and development (R&D) program14.
e VirtUE R&D program is developing a computing environment where each of a user’s daily
computing roles occupies its own isolated virtual environment (a VirtUE) without signicant impact
on the functionality to a user, e.g., separate Docker [63] containers could be launched for a user’s
email, internet browsing, and Sharepoint administration roles, while the user sees and interacts
with a single unied desktop presenting all these roles. Building isolated virtual environments
specically for constrained, well-dened user roles creates enhanced opportunities to sense and
protect those environments. VirtUE hopes to contrast this with the traditional user interface model
where all user roles are merged indistinguishably into one single shared-memory environment.
In the VirtUE Contegrity Challenge, competitors are tasked with accurately identifying aacks on
condentiality and integrity (contegrity) as eciently as possible. Specically, the competitors will
employ their detection analytics to analyze the security logs of six dierent role-specic Virtues.
Competitors will be tasked with minimizing the total amount of log data that their analytics
process while accurately detecting the presence of contegrity aacks on a Virtue. Each Virtue
will experience zero to two aacks over a time period of an hour for a total of 12 possible aacks.
e aacks fall into 16 categories (e.g., “Capturing or transporting encryption keys”, “Corrupting
output of a computation”), and performers must identify the class of the aack with each alert.
Alerts with the wrong classication are considered a false positive.
4.1.1 Competition Scoring Model. e goal of this section is to produce a scoring procedure that
accomplishes the following:
• rewards accuracy of the detector
• rewards timeliness of detection
• penalizes for bandwidth, processing, memory, and storage use
• is practical to compute for evaluating such a competition
In short, the scoring should take into account the accuracy, timeliness, and resource requirements
of the detection capability. We leverage the model above to determine a “cost of security” score for
each participant’s detector and the detector incurring the lowest cost wins.
To model the aacks, we assign a total value of the data each Virtue contains, and this provides
the asymptote (b) for the S-curve model as described in Section 3.1.1. Consulting Ponemon’s 2018
report [52], the average cost per client record aected in a breach was $148 in 2018. (We note that
Ponemon’s report focused on stolen customer data, which may not be an accurate estimate for
enterprise data.) Assuming 100 les per Virtue furnishes b = $14,800. To accommodate the 1-hour
competition duration, we choose the time parameter, α , so that 50% of the maximum possible cost,
b, is obtained in 5 minutes. us, α = 25 log(2). Note that while we model integrity aacks with
equal cost as condentiality aacks, in an alternate scenario one may adjust the model to give
greater cost to aacks against integrity. is is because an adversary with write access to some data
typically also has read access to that data, so aacks against integrity should be equal or greater
in cost. Altogether, our competition’s model for the cost of an integrity aack (in thousands of
14hps://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/virtue/virtue-baa
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dollars) t minutes aer initiation is
f (t) = 14.8e−25 log(2)/t 2 . (8)
See Figure 5. Finally, for each aack administered in the competition, we charge the participant
f (td ) thousand dollars, where td is the aack duration lasting from the start time of the aack
to either the time of correct detection or the end of the 1-hour competition. Note that since f is
increasing, this rewards early detection over later.
Fig. 5. Plot of S-curve f (t) = 14.8 exp(−25 log(2)/t2), the estimate of aack cost for VirtUE challenge.
For labor and resource costs, we follow Section 3.4, namely Tables 3 and 4, with some tweaks.
As the goal is to evaluate the ecacy of the detection algorithms, we can ignore licensing and
conguration costs for the detection soware (CIR = $0, CIL = $0), which is equivalent to assuming
each competitor’s soware incurs the same licensing and conguration costs, as well as baseline
labor costs (CBL = $0) and resources needed for incident response (CI RR = $0). Competing detection
capabilities will be furnished a uniform CPU and memory platform, hence CPU and memory costs
can be ignored.
As explained in Section 3.4.2 every alert will cost $80 to triage, regardless of whether the alert is
a true positive or false positive. If the alert is a true positive, the aack is considered detected and
remediated, and ceases to accrue cost; however, a xed $400 fee is incurred to represent the cost of
this remediation.
Ongoing resource costs for use (CBR ) and triage costs (CTR ) will be traceable during the competi-
tion. To estimate these costs, we monitor the volume of data sent in or out of the detector’s analytic
environment and charge a single per-volume rate of $150/MB to account for any bandwidth, storage,
or per-volume subscription fees (e.g., SIEMs). Just as the expected number and time-duration of
aacks (and therefore alert costs) are condensed to accommodate the 1-hour duration, we inated
the estimated data costs to make it comparable to the aack and alert costs expected.
Here we itemize this estimate. SOCs generally store logs and alerts for at least a year (e.g., see
[60]). is requires movement of data to a datastore, storage fees for a year, and SIEM license
fees. We estimate bandwidth costs at $1/GB based on the low estimate of $0.09 cloud bandwidth
fees (Table 3) and high estimates from mobile networks (e.g., needed by shipping vessels and
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deployed military units) that can cost $10-$15/GB. For 1 year of storage we consult the cloud costs
in Table 3 and obtain $0.10/GB/month ×12 months = $1.20/GB for 1 year of storage. For storage
and management soware price, we reference Splunk, costing $150 / GB / month.15 Our estimate is
$150 / GB / month × (1/730.5) month / hour = $0.20 / GB / hour for the portion of the SIEM fee
incurred in this 1-hour competition. Altogether, a reasonable estimate for data moved in or out
of the detector’s environment is $3.40/GB, comprised of: $1/GB for the observed data movement,
another $1/GB assuming a copy of it is sent to long term storage, $1.20/GB for storage fees, and
$0.20/GB for SIEM fees. Finally, we need to scale this price to be comparable to the condensed
aack costs in the hour. e aack volume is on the order of the number of aacks expected of a
single host in perhaps a calendar year, yet the competition involves only about a h of the Virtues
needed for a single virtual host. Consequently, to make the data costs comparable to the aack and
alert triage/remediation costs, we multiply by 5 × 24 hours/day × 365 days/year, giving $148.92/MB.
For simplicity we use $150/MB in the competition.
Altogether, the scoring evaluation is as follows:
• When the competition starts, the system is in a true negative state, and only the band-
width/storage used by the detector will be accruing costs. Total volume of data used by the
detector’s virtual environment will incur a fee of $150/MB.
• Every time an alert is given an $80 fee will be charged for triage.
• For every true positive alert, an additional $400 fee will be charged to represent the cost of
remediating the aack.
• Once an aack is detected, ∆td , the time from the start of the aack until detection, is
determined. e aack is considered ended and f (∆td ) thousand dollars is charged.
• Finally, at the end of the competition, for any ongoing (undetected) aacks their duration
(from start of the aack until the end of the competition) ∆td is determined. For each,
f (∆td ) thousand dollars is charged.
4.1.2 Testing the Virtue IDS Evaluation Framework: Simulations & Baselines. Importantly, we
seek conrmation that the scoring procedure does indeed reward a balance of accuracy, timeliness,
and preservation of resources. To investigate, we simulate some aack scenarios and defense
schemes and present the results. We create four separate scenarios with number of aacks, na =0,
4, 8, and 12, and the na aacks occurring at randomly sampled times (rounded to nearest two
minutes) in the hour with replacement.
Our detection models are as follows:
• Null detector - is detector simulates having no security measures. It uses no data, throws
no alerts and has maximum time to detection (60m - aack start time).
• Periodic hunting (10m) - is detector and the one below simulates a full system check at
preset intervals without continually monitoring any data. We assume it will detect any
ongoing aacks in each scan but will also incur many false positives by issuing all 16 alerts
at 10m, 20m, …, 50m. Data cost is $0 as it does not monitor hosts.
• Periodic hunting (30m) - Same as above but with only two scans at 15m and 45m.
• Low-data, low-speed detector - is and the detectors below simulate a real-time monitoring
IDS. It uses 5 MB of data (initial overhead) plus 0.1 MB per aack; Data(na) = 5 + 0.1na
MB. It throws 5 alerts plus 5 per aack; Alerts(na) = 5 + 5na . (Hence we assume that
with no aacks we obtain 5 false positives, and we assume that for each aack it sends an
additional 4 false alerts then the correct h alert.) It detects every aack at 3 minutes.
15Price from hps://www.splunk.com/en us/soware/pricing.html as of 09/25/2018.
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• Low-data medium-speed detector - Same as the above detector, but we assume it detects
every aack at 1.5m.
• High-data medium-speed detector - It uses 10 MB of data plus 1 MB per aack; Data(na) =
10+na MB. It throws 4 alerts plus 4 per aack; Alerts(na) = 4+ 4na . It detects every aack
at 1.5m.
• High-data high-speed detector - Same as above but it detects every aack at 15s.
Results are displayed in Figure 6 giving the average cost incurred by each simulated detector over
1000 runs in each aacks scenario (0, 4, 8, 12 aacks). As expected, the Null Detector (no security
measures) incurs no cost if there is no aack, but averages wildly high aack costs in the aack
scenarios. Periodic hunting for threats incurs a large cost during the investigations, but strictly
limits the aack costs. Performing the scans for aacks every 10m vastly outperforms periodic
hunting on 30m intervals when aacks are present. We see a dramatic drop in costs across all
scenarios with aacks when any real-time monitoring is assumed (last four detectors) even when
only approximately 1 true alert in 5 was assumed. See the boom bar chart for a zoom-in on the
three best simulated detectors. First note that decreasing time to detection in both the low-data and
high-data detectors also decreases costs, as desired. Further, as these four models increase linearly
with the number of aacks, simply looking at the 12-aack scenario suces. Next, note that the
overall best performance is by the low-data, medium-speed detector, which takes 1m to identify
an aack ($11,010 for 12-aack scenario). We note that while the high-data, high-speed detector
detects aacks six-times faster, its use of data increases its cost ($12,260 for 12-aack scenario), but
it is still slightly beer than the high-data medium-speed detector ($12,340 for 12-aack scenario)
as expected. ese nearly identical costs for the two high-speed detectors imply that detection
within the rst minute or so of an aack eectively prevents the aack; hence, it is not worth the
data costs to increase time to detection in this case.
Overall, these are comforting results because they suggest that simple heuristics for sending
alerts without actually monitoring activity will incur too large a penalty in terms of false positive
costs and aack costs to be as eective as intelligent monitoring. is indicates that the scoring
system is not easily ‘gamed’. Further, this shows that this cost model requires a balance of data use,
accuracy, and timeliness to minimize costs.
We hope these simulations provide useful baselines for competitors.
4.1.3 Comparing Results with Other Evaluation Methods. We now consider these simulated IDS
strategies through the lens of previous quantiable evaluation methods. For all scenarios we assume
720 non-aack events occur (one each 15-second interval)—note that this is needed for computing
accuracy metrics, but not for our cost evaluation as the number of false positive is dened in each
detection strategy and true negatives incur no costs.
Table 5 displays both the classical detection metrics and then an adaptation of the time-dependent
metrics proposed by Garcia et al. [2] (see Section 2.1.4 CTU Botnet Dataset). Results are micro-
averages across 1000 simulations. Recall that the CTU time-dependent detection metrics are
computed each time window and encode that earlier detection or non-detection of aack trac
(true positive and false negatives) is time-sensitive, but normal trac (true negative and false
positive) is not impacted by time. is is accomplished by computing the confusion matrix at each
time interval according to Section 2.1.4. To compute microaverages, the 720 confusion matrices are
summed for each simulation, then summed over the 1000 simulation, and then the accuracy metrics
are computed. To adapt their framework to this experiment we set parameter α = 1, and used
15-second time windows. Note that once an aack begins, false negative scores are gained until
it is detected, aer which point true positive scores are gained; furthermore, since false positives
only occur on the time intervals in which false alerts are produced, this scoring inates precision
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Fig. 6. For each scenario (No. Aacks = 0, 4, 8, 12), the cost incurred by each simulated detector was computed
over 1000 runs and the average cost reported in the bar charts. Top bar chart presents the full results, while
the lower bar chart is simply a zoom-in on the last three detectors.
and deates the false positive rate. Further, we note that the actual scores produced are brile
depending on the number of time intervals used.
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Table 5. Standard and CTU Time-Dependent Accuracy Metrics
Standard Metrics CTU Metrics
Detection Strategy TPR FPR Precision TPR FPR Precision
Null detector 0.0 0.0 N/A 0.076 0.0 1.0
Periodic hunting (10m) 0.864 0.097 0.13 0.794 0.001 0.999
Periodic hunting (30m) 0.759 0.032 0.285 0.563 0.000 0.999
Low-data low-speed detector 0.967 0.106 0.178 0.879 0.008 0.991
Low-data medium-speed detector 1.0 0.09 0.185 0.922 0.008 0.992
High-data medium-speed detector 1.0 0.072 0.231 0.922 0.006 0.993
High-data high-speed detector 1.0 0.072 0.231 0.987 0.006 0.994
Table depicting the standard accuracy metrics and the CTU time-dependent metrics (Sec 2.1.4). Results are
microaverages over 1000 simulations. Note that the standard metrics promote the most accurate detectors
(high-data *) as both time to detection and host resources are not respected. Whereas, the CTU time-dependent
metrics favor the high-speed detectors that exhibit more accuracy and speed but neglect host resources used.
Recall our metric promoted the low-data medium-speed detector as a balance of accuracy, host resources, and
timely detection.
Beginning with the standard accuracy metrics our simulation produces best results for the high-
data high- and medium-speed detectors. is is unsurprising as it neglects both the host resources
used and the time to detection; hence, it promotes these two and has no means of distinguishing
them. e CTU time-dependent metrics take into account time to detection, but not host resources.
Hence, we see it champions the high-data, high-speed detector.
As a nal baseline, we revisit the 1/e rule of the Gordon-Loeb (GL) Model 2.3.4, which states
that the optimal cost of security should be bounded above by the estimated loss to aacks over e .
For the 12-aack scenario, the Null detector (no security) simulated costs was $159,093. Dividing
by e gives the GL upper bound for optimal security costs of $58,527. We note that both the periodic
detectors are above this bound, while all four monitoring simulations are under it.
4.2 GraphPrints Evaluation Example
In this section we revisit our previous work [1] that introduced GraphPrints, a network-level
anomaly detector using graph-analytics. Our goal is to provide an example of the evaluation
framework as an alternative to the usual true-positive/false-positive analysis given in the original
paper and commonly used for such research works. Additionally, the example illustrates how
the cost-benet analysis can benet (1) the researchers evaluation of a new technology, (2) SOC
operators from the perspective of considering adoption as if GraphPrints were a viable commercial
o-the-shelf technology and (3) from the point of view of a vendor deciding on the price of such a
product.
4.2.1 GraphPrints Overview. e GraphPrints algorithm uses network ow data to build a
directed graph from each time slice (e.g., 30s.) of ows. e graph’s nodes represent IPs and
directed, colored edges represent connections with port information.
Graph-level detection: For each graph the number of graphlets—small, node-induced sub-graphs—
are counted. is gives a feature vector encoding the local topology of the communications in that
time window. A streaming anomaly detection algorithm is performed on the sequence of graphlet
vectors. Specically, a multivariate gaussian distribution is t to the history of observed vectors,
and new graphlet vectors with a suciently low p-value (equiv. high mahalanobis distance) are
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detected as anomalous. Finally, the newly scored vector is added to the history of observations,
and the process repeats upon receipt of the next vector. is provides an anomaly detector for the
whole IP space represented by the graph. We note that the original GraphPrints paper [1] also
describes a related, node-level detector (following Bridges et al. [64]), but for the sake of clarity, we
provide the evaluation for only the network-level technology.
4.2.2 GraphPrints Evaluation. For testing in the original paper [1], real network ow data was
implanted with biorrent trac as a surrogate for an aack. As torrenting was against policy it
indeed constituted anomalous trac. Secondly, it was chosen as biorrent trac appears as an
internal IP contacting many external, abnormal IPs and moving data, potentially similar to malware
beaconing or data exltration.
e initial evaluation sought to show the existence of a window of thresholds for the detector
that gave “good” true/false positive balance. See Figure 7. At the network level with the depicted
threshold the test exhibited perfect true positive rate and 2.84% false positive rate. We manually
investigated the false positives nding they were IP-scans originating from internal hosts assigned
to the company’s IT sta. Presumably this was legitimate activity causing false positives, e.g., a
vulnerability or asset scanning appliance.
We provide an instantiation of our evaluation framework as a more informative alternative to
the true/false positive analysis of the detection capability. To estimate the initial resource cost,
CIR , the cost of necessary hardware is tallied. Based on preliminary testing we conducted, to run
the algorithm in real time a separate instance should be used to model roughly 2,500 IPs. at
is, we expect a large network to be divided into subnets with separate GraphPrints instances per
subnet, e.g., an operation w/ 10,000 IPs would require n = 10, 000/2, 500 = 4 GraphPrints servers.
Since all costs except the initial subscription will scale by n we neglect this factor in the analysis
and note that the nal gures grow linearly with the network size. We contacted a few SOCs
regarding server specications for such a technology, and they pointed us to inkmate HPC16
and Cisco UCS C220 M4 rack server17 costing approximately between $2K to $15K depending
on conguration options. Additionally they mentioned adding 15% for un-included hardware,
e.g., racks, cords, etc. Most soware used is opensource (e.g., Linux OS). Altogether, we estimate
CIR = $7, 500 × (1.15) = $8, 625 per instance. Additionally, the initial labor costs to congure the
servers we estimate at one day giving CIL = $70/hour hours = $560, following rates estimated in
Section 3.4.3.
For CBR we assume the operation already collects and stores network ows, so adding this
technology will add only alerts to the storage costs, and will add ows and alerts to the bandwidth
cost, as alerts are sent to the SIEM and ows must be sent from the ow sensor to the GraphPrints
server. For storage costs, if we assume 500KB/month/server, estimates in Table 3 give 500 × 10−6
GB/month ×$0.10/GB = $5 × 10−5/month. Since this is a negligible amount of money, we ignore
this term in the estimate. For bandwidth costs, assuming $0.10/GB, a low-end estimate for data
transfer since it is internal, we estimate about 15GB of ows are produced per subnet per month,
giving $1.5/month. is is again, a negligible amount comparatively, so we ignore CBR .
We estimate that each instance of GraphPrints will require weekly reconguration, e.g., threshold
adjustment or a heuristic implemented to reduce false positives, and we allocate 1 person hour per
week per instance. From estimates in Section 3.4.3, CBL =$70 / week × 4 weeks / month = $280 /
month.
16www.thinkmate.com/systems/servers/rax
17www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/servers-unied-computing/ucs-c220-m4-rack-server/index.html
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Fig. 7. Original plot from GraphPrints paper [1] depicting network-level anomaly scores. Suggested threshold
is depicted by the horizontal, red, dashed line. Vertical green dashed lines indicate beginning/ending of
simulated aack (positives). Spikes above the threshold, outside the aack period are false positives.
For triage and incident response costs, we reuse the estimates from the VirtUE challenge above;
namely, we assume a at average of $80 per false positive, and $480 per true positive. Similarly, for
breach costs we use the S curve fron the VirtUE challenge given in Equation 8. Given the results
above (Figure 7) we assume a perfect true positive rate with near immediate detection (assume,
containment within 1 minute response time), and a 2.84% false positive rate. For each GraphPrints
instance, a scored event occurs every 30s time window giving 86,400 events × 2.84% = 2,454 false
positives per month, accruing 2,454 × $80 = $196,320/month. If we assume each instance incurs
one aacks per month, then a 1-minute response time gives response + aack costs of $480 + f (1)
= $480 / month (aack costs are negligible with fast detection).
Altogether, the cost of adopting this technology, neglecting licensing or subscription fees is
estimated as an initial one-time resource and conguration fee of $8,625+560 = $ 9,185 and a
ongoing monthly cost of $ (196,320 + 2,400 + 280) = $199,000 per instance! To put this gure in
perspective, we consider two alternatives—the estimate without adopting the technology and the
estimate assuming reconguration addresses the false positives.
Without this technology, if the lone aack per required 10m for detection and containment, then
our cost estimate is simply $480 +f (10) / month / instance = $12,905 / month / instance. Applying
the GL 1/e rule of thumb, we see optimal security costs should be below $12,905/e = $4,747 per
month per instance or $56,970 per year per instance.
In the more interesting reconguration scenario, we note that the false positives found in testing
were occurring from legitimate network scanning appliances tripping the GraphPrints detector.
Common practice for handling such false positives involves continually tuning tools [60, 62]. As
we included the labor costs for monthly reconguration, it is reasonable to assume that each
such false positive would occur one time, then reconguration would prevent the same alert. In
this case, the there would be only the lone, rst false positives in the testing window (Figure 7),
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so our false positive rate drops to 0.56%. With this false positive rate, we incur 86,400 events ×
0.56% = 14 false positives per month per instance, for a cost of 14 × $80 = $1,120. Now the cost
for adopting the GraphPrints technology is the initial $9,185 server cost plus $ (1,120 + 2,400 +
280) = $3,800/month/instance. We note that this is indeed below the GL upper bound. Neglecting
initial costs, the technology promises a yearly savings to customers of 12 months × $(12,905 -
$3,800)/month = $109,260. With the initial costs for hardware and conguration included, we see
operations will save about $100,000 / year.
From the point of a researcher, such an analysis is enlightening, as it allows quantitative reasoning
about the impact of the true/false positive analysis and resource requirements. Further, it gives
a single metric to optimize when, for example, deciding a threshold for detection. From a SOC’s
perspective, provided the numbers above are reasonable estimates, the conclusion is clear—if
false positives can be mostly eliminated with one-o reconguration tuning, then this is a good
investment; if not, then this is a terrible investment. We recommend a testing period to give a
much more informed decision on both the gures estimated above and the nal decision. Finally,
from the perspective of the vendor, such an estimate can help dial in their yearly subscription fees.
Yearly cost to use this technology are $9,185 (server cost) +12 × 3, 800 = $54,785 plus subscription
fees. If a subscription is required per instance (scales with n), then annual subscription cost can
be bounded above by the GL bound minus the operational costs, that is, they should be less than
$56,970 - 54,785 = $2,185 to keep total costs under the GL rule of thumb.
5 CONCLUSION
Useful security metrics are important for estimating the ecacy of new products or new technolo-
gies, important for evaluating red team or competition events, and important for organizations
which must weigh the cost verses benet of security practices. As we have described, each of
those three areas have developed their own generally accepted metrics within their topic areas, but
these have been focused too narrowly, and cannot easily be applied from one area to another. For
example, it is currently dicult to take the statistical metrics from researcher testing of an IDS and
estimate the impact on a specic organization. In this paper, we have proposed a unied approach,
which generalizes and combines the traditional metrics in these areas in a exible framework by
comprehensively modeling the various costs involved. is provides a congurable cost model
that balances accuracy, timeliness, and resource use. Moreover, it is easy to interpret and analyze.
To illustrate the ecacy of the new model, we tune it to be used as the scoring procedure for an
upcoming IARPA IDS competition, and use simulated aack/defense scenarios to test the ecacy
of the cost framework. Our results support that a balance of accuracy, response time, and resource
use are promoted by the model. Finally, we exhibit the use of this new model to evaluate a new
security tool from multiple points of view, specically the researcher, the SOC (client), and the
vendor. Our results show the model can provide clear and actionable insights from each.
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